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ABSTRACT: Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-
that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a 
rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s 
reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this 
discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the 
confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as 
insurmountable as it seems, at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are 
motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect 
of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice. 
KEYWORDS: knowing-how, intelligence, intellectualism, 
dispositions, behaviourism 
 
1. The Debate About Know-How: What Is at Stake? 
We have assisted in recent years to a live debate about the nature of knowledge-
how, but it seems to be difficult to identify what is exactly under dispute in it. The 
origin of the debate are two famous texts by Gilbert Ryle,1 where he famously 
defended that knowing-how is not knowing-that, complaining about the 
intellectualist slant manifested by those who tried to reduce the former to the 
latter. 
Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is quite familiar to all 
of us between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do things. 
In their theories of knowledge they concentrate on the discovery of truths or 
facts, and they either ignore the discovery of ways and methods of doing things or 
else they try to reduce it to the discovery of facts. They assume that intelligence 
equates with the contemplation of propositions and is exhausted in its 
contemplations.2 
Attempting to manifest the shortcomings of intellectualism, Ryle would 
have shown that agents do not know how to φ when they have grasped some 
                                                        
1 “Knowing How and Knowing That,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46 (1946): 1-16; 
The Concept of Mind (London: Routledge, 2009, first published in 1949). 
2 Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That,” 4. 
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truths about the practice of φ-ing, but when they have the power to φ, the skill to 
φ well, the ability to achieve success in φ-ing in the relevant circumstances, etc—
all of which are issues related to what the agent is able to do, and not to what 
propositional attitudes she endorses.  
Ryle’s views became a kind of general consensus, which was underwritten 
by Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson’s defence of intellectualism in a paper 
that proved to be as unexpected as influential.3 According to Stanley and 
Williamson, there is no fundamental distinction between knowledge-how and 
knowledge-that, given that the former is, in their opinion, a species of the latter—a 
view that they defended with the help of much apparently solid linguistic 
evidence.4 
In the last years different positions have been proposed on one side or the 
other of the intellectualist divide, mostly arising from development or criticism of 
Stanley and Williamson’s original proposal.5 However, in my view, the terms of 
                                                        
3 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy 98, 8 
(2001): 411-444. 
4 According to Stanley and Williamson, knowing-how would have exactly the same syntactic 
structure as knowing-what, knowing-when, or knowing-why, all of which are just a matter of 
knowing facts, and thus are cases of propositional knowledge. The case of knowing-how would 
be quite a sui generis variety of knowing-that: one where the agent knows de se that there is a 
way for her to perform the action in question, a way that she must grasp under a practical mode 
of presentation. At the very same time that Stanley and Williamson’s seminal paper came out, 
Jesús Vega was problematizing the Rylean idea of “practical understanding” and showing that it 
needed a better articulation with propositional knowledge, mediated by experience and practice. 
See his “Reglas, medios, habilidades. Debates en torno al análisis de «S sabe cómo hacer X»,” 
Crítica 33, 98 (2001): 3-40. 
5 Several authors have followed their way, defending different varieties of intellectualism. For 
instance: Paul Snowdon, “Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered,” 
Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society 105, 1 (2004): 1-29; John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, 
“Know-How and Concept Possession,” Philosophical Studies 136, 1 (2007): 31-57 and “Two 
Conceptions of Mind and Action. Knowing How and the Philosophical Theory of Intelligence,” 
in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, edited by John Bengson and Marc A. 
Moffett (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-55; Berit Brogaard, “Knowledge-How: A 
Unified Account,” in Knowing How, edited by Bengson and Moffett, 136-160; Yuri Cath, 
“Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier,” Philosophical Studies 172, 1 (2015): 7-2; Carlotta 
Pavese, “Know-How and Gradability,” Philosophical Review 126, 3 (2017): 345-383. Stanley and 
Williamson themselves come back to the issue in “Skill,” Noûs 51, 4 (2017): 713-726. On the 
opposite side of the divide, the moves have been, with some exceptions, more aggressive or 
defensive than constructive, by which I mean that different attacks have been levelled at the 
new intellectualist arguments, but little has been done yet in order to build up a full-blown 
positive epistemological alternative. Amongst the most recent ones are Ellen Fridland, “Problems 
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the debate are far from being unanimously established, as well as its proper object. 
Different positions in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and 
metaphysics interfere with the strictly epistemological problem, making it hard to 
figure out what the genuine bone of contention is. For that reason, I would like to 
stipulate for the sake of this paper some basic terminology, differentiating three 
levels under dispute: epistemological concerns, pre-conceptual assumptions and 
metaphysical theories.  
First, I will use the term “intellectualism” to label a very specific epistemic 
position about the nature of knowledge-how: 
INTELLECTUALISM: Knowing how to φ is knowing that p is the case.6 
This epistemic thesis (i.e. a claim about what that particular kind of 
knowledge is) was the focus of Gilbert Ryle’s criticism in the aforementioned 
papers, both entitled “Knowing How and Knowing That.” Given that Ryle was 
opposing INTELLECTUALISM, it is not weird that his own opinion was latter 
labelled as “anti-intellectualism,” but I find this utterly misleading because, strictly 
speaking, "anti-intellectualism" is no positive thesis, but just the denial of 
INTELLECTUALISM. At least, that is the sense that I will give to the term here:  
ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM: Knowing how to φ is not knowing that p is the case.  
Notice that ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM, unlike INTELLECTUALISM, just 
says what knowledge-how is not, not making any positive claim about what it 
                                                                                                                      
with intellectualism,” Philosophical Studies 165, 3 (2013): 879-891; “Knowing-How: Problems 
and Considerations,” European Journal of Philosophy 23, 3 (2015): 703–727; J. Adam Carter and 
Duncan Pritchard, “Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 91, 1 (2015): 181–199; J. Adam Carter and Bolesaw Czarnecki, 
“(ANTI)-Anti-Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98, 1 
(2017): 374-97; William Hasselberger, “Propositional Attitudes and Embodied Skills in the 
Philosophy of Action,” European Journal of Philosophy 26, 1 (2018): 449-76; Carter, J. Adam, y 
Jesús Navarro, “The Defeasibility of knowledge-how,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 95, 3 (2017): 662–685. See J. Adam Carter and Ted Poston, A Critical Introduction to 
Knowledge How (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018) for a critical overview. Finally, a more 
constructive attitude on the anti-intellectualist side may be found in David Löwenstein, Know-
how as Competence: a Rylean Responsibilist Account (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann: 
2017). 
6 Nowadays, intellectualism is sometimes defined as the much weaker claim that knowing how is 
at least partially grounded in some propositional attitude—see for instance Bengson and Moffett 
“Two Conceptions,” 7. Nevertheless, for reasons that will be explained, I find it disputable that 
such a weak thesis was the target of Ryle’s original attacks, as Bengson and Moffett themselves 
seem to assume (Ibid, 9 note 11). 
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actually is.7 Denying a concrete response to one question does not imply the 
acceptance of any other particular positive answer to that same question. Ryle 
might have had a positive thesis on the nature of knowledge-how—what I will 
later call “Ryleanism”—but I find it utterly misleading to label his alleged positive 
view as "anti-intellectualism," since there may be other positive views on the 
nature of knowledge-how, besides Ryleanism, that would share the negative point 
that it is not a species of knowledge-that.  
In any case, Ryle’s epistemological focus in these papers was framed in a 
wider philosophical project, whose aim was beyond epistemology (or beneath it). 
He aimed to impeach a general pre-conceptual understanding of the mind that, 
according to Ryle, was dominant at his time, which he labels in different ways: 
“the prevailing doctrine,” “the official theory,” “the intellectualist legend”… a way 
of thinking that he finds somehow related to INTELLECTUALISM in 
epistemology. Many of his readers have found it annoying that Ryle does not take 
any particular author as his enemy, constructing a mysterious “legend” as a kind of 
straw man that nobody actually ever defended. This accusation is unfair, given that 
contenders of Ryle were flesh and blood authors,8 but I still believe that there is an 
explanation for the uneasiness that Ryle produces in his many of readers by being 
so reluctant to discuss particular theories. The reason for this is that Ryle was not 
attacking any explicit theoretical view, either in the field of metaphysics or the 
philosophy of mind, but a kind of unarticulated and pre-conceptual assumption 
beneaththeoretical activity in those fields. A kind of implicit presupposition that 
had become a piece of common sense—at least common in the limited academic 
community. I will articulate that intuition in the following terms:  
HIDDEN: intelligence is not something that may be directly observable in the 
agent’s behaviour, but only predicated of it in so far as it is a manifestation of 
some hidden state or process, which is not itself observable. 
                                                        
7 Notice that INTELLECTUALISM, thus defined, is even compatible with the views of some 
authors that consider themselves nowadays as “intellectualists,” such as Bengson and Moffett’s 
(see note 6), in so far as they assume a weaker thesis than the one that strictly identifies 
knowledge-how with knowledge-that. 
8 Michael Kremer has shown there was a real intellectual debate around intellectualism before 
the Second World War, with authors who actually held positions very similar to the ones 
contested by Ryle. See his “Ryle’s ‘Intellectualist Legend’ in Historical Context,” Journal for the 
History of Analytical Philosophy 5, 5 (2017): 16-39. However, as Kremer convincingly shows, 
what Ryle was attempting to undermine was the common assumption behind that debate, which 
shows why his own view ought not be simply understood as the denial of intellectualism. See 
also Will Small, “Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowledge How,” Journal for the History of 
Analytical Philosophy 5, 5 (2017): 56-76. 
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Realising that HIDDEN is not some author’s thesis, hypothesis or theory is 
of utmost importance.9 It does not work as a positive statement that could be made 
explicit and defended by solid arguments, but as a kind of pre-theoretical 
assumption that motivates a certain direction in the inquiry about the mental, 
shaping what any valuable answer may look like.10 HIDDEN is what commits any 
explicit philosophical conception of the mind to explain why mental epithets and, 
in particular, those related to ‘intelligence,’ may be predicated of people’s actions, 
given that it is not the sort of thing that we could ever see in their behaviour. 
Those assuming HIDDEN are committed to the task of explaining what it is that 
makes behavioural patterns intelligent—viz. in virtue of which kind of inner and 
hidden processes, unobservable by others, occurring in each agent’s private 
‘grotto,’ is their behaviour intelligent.  
HIDDEN, in and by itself, is no metaphysical claim—although it could 
certainly favour some metaphysical views over others. Assuming HIDDEN as an 
implicit starting point,authors might defenddualist, materialist, functionalistor 
emergentist views about the nature of the mind, just to mention a few possibilities, 
because HIDDEN says nothing about the nature of the alleged hidden processes 
where intrinsic intelligence is supposed to be located, or about the sort of 
connections that such process have with those occurrences that we actually see. 
HIDDEN just invites us to look for the mental somewhere else—as opposed toin—
what we actually see in behaviour.  
One may think that, in contrast to HIDDEN, INTELLECTUALISM is a 
positive metaphysical statement. But strictly speaking it is not, since it says nothing 
about the nature of the mind or its processes either, or about the way it deals with 
propositional contents, or about the kind of relation (causal, functional, 
explanatory…) that the mind has with those performances that we observe. Unlike 
HIDDEN, INTELLECTUALISM is a theoretical thesis, but not one that belongs to 
metaphysics, or to the philosophy of mind, but to the theory of knowledge.  
 
                                                        
9 Will Small holds that "The central target (...) of Ryle's discussion in the second, third, and 
fourth chapters of (The Concept of Mind) taken together is the view that to credit some piece of 
behaviour with displaying qualities of mind we must appeal to inner mental causes of it. I will 
call this general view causalism" (“Ryle on the Explanatory Role,” 59). I would not disagree with 
Small’s exegetical point in those specific texts, but I believe it is important to realise that 
causalism too is just a case that exemplifies the general pattern that is Ryle’s target. 
10 This is the reason why I prefer the label HIDDEN to the one Hasselberger uses for a very 
similar view, namely “Neo-Carthesian presupposition” (“Propositional Attitudes,” 15). 
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2. How Not To Introduce the Debate 
My intention while introducing those terminological distinctions is not so much 
exegetical as instrumental. I do not hold that these are the exact definitions that 
Ryle had in mind, but that distinguishing the terms in this way will prove 
beneficial while we approach the theoretical arena.  
The predominant strategy that anti-intellectualists have adopted until quite 
recently has been to defend Ryle against the attacks of the new trend of 
intellectualism that stems from Stanley and Williamson, either by modifying Ryle’s 
position or by showing that the arguments levelled against it are not solid. My 
proposal here is to adopt a different strategy, in the wake of what may be 
considered as a new wave in the anti-intellectualist party: namely, to show that 
Ryle’s views have been seriously misconstrued in this debate.11 In this sense, I 
would like to defend Ryle but, most importantly, not Stanley and Williamson’s 
Ryle, which in my view is a misconstruction that results, as I will show, from a 
slanted reading of his work. I will focus in particular on Jason Stanley’s later 
developments of intellectualism12 with a double intention: first, to put forward a 
better understanding of Ryle’s views resulting from a more charitable reading of 
his work; and second, to show that, surprisingly enough (at least for me!), this 
different reading paves the way for a possible understanding between Stanley and 
what I take to be the original Ryle. Preparing the ground for such understanding is 
the final goal of this paper, and what explains its title.  
Before reaching Stanley, I will stop for a moment to consider the way John 
Bengson and Mark A. Moffett introduce the debate on knowledge how in their 
conscientious introduction to the volume they co-edited on the topic, which I find 
paradigmatic of an unfortunate approach that confuses the different levels that I 
tried to separate in the previous section: 
Intelligence-epithets often modify overt behaviours, such as pruning trees. But 
Ryle is keenly aware that Intelligent actions, such as pruning trees skilfully, are 
not distinguishable from non-Intelligent actions in virtue of any overt features of 
the performance; rather, we must “look beyond the performance itself.”13 
In my view, Bengson’s and Moffett introduction to the debate dooms it to 
degenerate into a sort of dispute about which is the better way to respond to 
                                                        
11 Dissatisfaction with respect to Stanley and Williamson’s reading of Ryle has been a part of the 
debate since the beginning, but a milestone in this respect is the monographic issue edited by 
Julia Tanney in the Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy (2017). 
12 In particular, Know How (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) and “Knowing (How),” Noûs 
45, 2 (2011): 207-238. 
13 “Two Conceptions,” 6. 
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HIDDEN, taking for granted that such intuition must somehow or another be 
satisfied by any theory we may seriously consider. Bengson and Moffett are 
quoting Ryle here, but they make sense of his “beyond” in a way that forces him to 
search for intelligence elsewhere when, perhaps, it could be there, at sight, in 
behaviour itself, in the light of the possibilities and eventualities that it makes 
manifest. It is right that this “elsewhere” does not have to be inherently 
mysterious, or essentially inaccessible, but still in Bengson and Moffett’s reading it 
could not simply be there, at sight. The possibility of holding that intelligence is in 
the act itself seems to be a non-starter from Bengson and Moffett’s perspective. 
That is why the different positions in the debate show up in their description of 
the scene as alternative ways to account for one structurally similar intuition:  
The core contention of the intellectualist side of this line is that states of 
Intelligence and exercises thereof are at least partially grounded in propositional 
attitudes. The core contention of the anti-intellectualist side, by contrast is that 
states of Intelligence and exercises thereof are grounded in powers (abilities or 
dispositions to behavior), not in propositional attitudes.14 
Unfortunately, HIDDEN appears here as the common ground where all the 
contenders must find their own place, Ryle included, who is presented as the one 
who defends the view that the invisible place where we have to look for 
intelligence is in the agent’s abilities or dispositions: 
Whereas anti-intellectualism allows that we detect abilities or dispositions in 
virtue of witnessing actual performances (in diverse circumstances, on multiple 
occasions, etc.), intellectualism allows that we detect attitudes in virtue of 
witnessing such performances. Either way, we manage to “look beyond the 
performance itself” to a power (ability, disposition) or intellectual state (attitude) 
of the individual that is distinct from any particular overt behaviour.15 
Bengsonand Moffett’s apparently balanced formulation is highly problematic 
on closer inspection because INTELLECTUALISM and ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM 
are not structurally similar hypotheses—a point that will take some unpacking. 
Given that knowledge-that involves a psychological attitude towards some 
propositional content, defendants of INTELLECTUALISM have to claim that 
knowledge-how is also constituted by such propositional attitude. That is why 
INTELLECTUALISM is in natural accordance with HIDDEN: it would give an 
answer to the question for the ‘elsewhere’ intelligence stems from: the agent’s 
propositional attitudes. But Ryle’s position ought not be introduced by the same 
sort of argument just by substituting “psychological or propositional attitude” for 
                                                        
14 Ibid, 18. 
15 Ibid, 30. 
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“ability,” “disposition” or “power.” Otherwise, we could not construe him but as 
another positive attempt to satisfy HIDDEN.  
Quoting in length the passage cited by Bengson and Moffett will help realise 
the infelicity of their presentation of the different views under dispute:  
In judging that someone’s performance is or is not intelligent, we have, as has 
been said, in a certain manner to look beyond the performance itself. For there is 
no particular overt or inner performance which could not have been accidentally 
or ‘mechanically’ executed by an idiot, a sleepwalker, a man in panic, absence of 
mind or delirium or even, sometimes, by a parrot. But in looking beyond the 
performance itself, we are not trying to pry into some hidden counterpart 
performance enacted on the supposed secret stage of the agent’s inner life. We are 
considering his abilities and propensities of which this performance was an 
actualisation.16 
We cannot express Ryle’s views as the claim that the 
mysterioussomethingwe must be looking for is the ability, the capacity, the power 
or the disposition,which may not be directly observable, and must be somewhere 
hidden in the agent, making it the case that her behaviour manifests intelligence. 
However, from Bengson and Moffett’s point of view, all contenders would agree on 
the idea that what makes a performance intelligent is some additional feature that 
can only be conjectured, hypothesized, or just indirectly inferred, which is 
precisely the very idea that Ryle intended to criticise. Bengsonand Moffett’s 
introduction to the debate is thus committing all contenders to respond to the 
intuition of HIDDEN, searching for the place where intelligence really happens, 
given that in principle it cannot be out there, at sight.  
3. Stanley's Ryle 
I will now focus on Stanley’s 2011 pieces (Know How and “Knowing (How)”), 
which are developments of the view he put forward with Timothy Williamson in 
their 2001 paper. In section one we have seen that Ryle’s original criticism of 
INTELLECTUALISM was motivated by the fact that that epistemological thesis is 
somehow in accordance with the kind of unfortunate pre-theoretical intuition that 
I have labelled HIDDEN. At this point, it seems pertinent to ask whether Stanley’s 
defence of INTELLECTUALISM may also be considered as being in accordance 
with HIDDEN. The answer to this question will be crucial to take a stand on 
Stanley’s understanding of the Rylean project. The question then is: is Stanley's 
aim to defend a notion of intelligence that confines it to the privacy of the mind 
                                                        
16 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 33. 
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(HIDDEN) when he claims that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that 
(INTELLECTUALISM)?  
I believe not: a careful reading of his proposal shows that Stanley’s 
INTELLECTUALISM is not a defence of HIDDEN, but a different attempt to 
escape from it—whether a successful one or not is something that remains to be 
elucidated. Unfortunately, Stanley does not elaborate on this point, and his 
position regarding the kind of intuitions I have phrased as HIDDEN remains 
obscure. Instead of positioning himself explicitly for or against them, he focuses on 
the epistemological claim of INTELLECTUALISM, raising a direct confrontation 
with Ryle that, as I will show, loses track of what was originally at stake in his 
proposal. Had Stanley directly discussed Ryle's main goal, he would probably have 
found that the kind of position he himself is championing has much in common 
with Ryle's original project. However, instead of pursuing this line of thought, he 
reads Ryle in a way that, from the outset, seems to be far from charitable, 
discrediting him for holding old fashioned views that “No one thinks anymore,” 
and are “now universally rejected.”17 The result is a reading that some authors have 
found highly disputable.18 
I will summarise Stanley’s reading of Ryle in six points, all of which I find 
mistaken. According to Stanley, Gilbert Ryle is: 
(1) Unclear about his own positive position. 
(2) A verificationist on meaning. 
(3) A behaviourist on the nature of the mind. 
(4) A fictionalist on mental states and processes. 
(5) A ‘preachivist’ on knowledge-that. 
(6) A ‘distinctivist’ on the relationship between action and theory.  
The nature of claims (1) to (4) is crucially different from the one of (5) and 
(6). The former group, which I will analyse in sections four and five, are explicit 
attacks that Stanley directs towards Ryle, in the sense that Stanley is aware that 
                                                        
17 Stanley, Know How, 7. 
18 For instance, Stephen Hetherington, “Knowledge and Knowing: Ability and Manifestation,” in 
Conceptions of knowledge, edited by Stefan Tolksdorf (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 73-100; 
Jennifer Hornsby, “Ryle’s Knowing-How, and Knowing How to Act,” in Knowing How, edited 
by Bengson and Moffett, 80-98. In the same volume, Paul Snowdon’s contribution (“Rylean 
Arguments: Ancient and Modern,” 59-79) is also critical, although less strongly. For more recent 
criticism, see Julia Tanney, “Gilbert Ryle on Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and 
Theoretical Knowledge,” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5, 5 (2017), and both 
Kremer’s and Small’s contribution to that volume. 
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Ryle rejects those accusations. In contrast, (5) and (6) are not accusations, but 
attempts to objectively paraphrase Ryle’s views in ways Ryle would allegedly 
consider valid, according to Stanley. I will hold that the fact that Stanley sees those 
two last theses as faithful summaries of Ryle's views is still more pernicious than 
the fact that he makes the precedent unfair accusations, because it shows that he is 
missing the core of his opponent’s position. That is the reason why, in section six, I 
will analyse in depth those two later points, contrasting them with a 
reconstruction of Ryle's original arguments.  
4. Lack of Clarity 
Even if, at first glance, Ryle's style might be the most crystalline one a philosopher 
might have ever achieved, the complaint that his positive position on the nature of 
knowledge-how—what I have called “Ryleanism”—is unclear is quite widespread, 
even among those who are willing to follow his lead. He did say, quite 
indisputably, that, when attributing knowing how, we are normally talking about 
people's abilities and capacities—viz. what they are able to do, their powers—, and 
not about the intellectual truths that they have grasped. And he did say that 
knowing how “is a disposition, but not a single-track disposition like a reflex or 
habit.”19 But would Ryle defend a strict reduction of knowing how to those 
abilities, powers and dispositions? The answer is anything but clear. Some authors 
(mostly intellectualists) identify his view with a sometimes called “ability thesis,” 
whereas others (mostly anti-intellectualists) deny that such a simple view was ever 
held by Ryle, or at least find the idea disputable.20 
To make things worse, not only Ryle’s positive views on the nature of 
knowledge-how is enigmatic, but also his positive views about the relationship 
between knowledge-how and knowledge-that—i.e., his response to what Kremer 
calls the challenge of “accounting for the unity of knowledge.”21 In this sense, Ryle 
may be interpreted in at least three possible ways: practicalism, unitarianism and 
pluralism. First, he may be read as not just attacking INTELLECTUALISM, but as 
                                                        
19The Concept of Mind, 34. 
20 See for instance Jeremy Fantl, “Knowing-How and Knowing-That,” Philosophy Compass 3 3 
(2008): 455 and n10; Jennifer Hornsby, “Ryle’s Knowing How,” 82; Benjamin Elzinga, “Self-
Regulation and Knowledge-How,” Episteme 15, 1 (2018): 119-140; David Löwenstein, Know 
How as Competence, 6. There is some insightful criticism from an intellectualist position in 
Natalia Waights Hickman, “Knowing in the ‘Executive Way’: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, 
Principles and Criteria,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10.1111/phpr.12488 (2018), 
5.  
21 “A Capacity to Get Things Right: Gilbert Ryle on Knowledge,” European Journal of Philosophy 
25, 1 (2016): 25. 
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defending the opposite thesis, attempting to reduce knowledge-that to a species of 
knowledge-how—a view that is sometimes called “strong anti-intellectualism” or 
“practicalism.”22 It is hard to deny that, at some points, Ryle seems to be quite akin 
to this idea, for instance, when he explicitly claims that knowledge-how is 
logically prior to knowledge-that,23 or when he holds that knowledge-that 
presupposes knowledge-how as its precedent (because one may only know a truth 
if one is able to previously perform actions that amount to knowledge-how, or 
because one may only count as knowing that such and such is the case if one also 
knows how to give good reasons to hold it).24 And, on top of that, Ryle holds that 
understanding is a part of knowing how,25 which, if right, and given that knowing 
that p appears to require understanding p, seems to imply that know-how must be 
at least a constitutive element of knowledge-that.  
A second possible reading of Ryle, unitarianism,would construct his view 
not as the one that knowing-that may be reduced to knowing-how, but as claiming 
that both concepts have a common root. Such an interpretation has been put 
forward by Michael Kremer, who holds that there is a core meaning involved in 
the different uses of the verb ‘knows,’ one that covers both knowing-how and 
knowing-that.26 According to his interpretation of Ryle, which he bases on views 
by John Hyman,27 to know is to have a ‘capacity to get things right’. Even if 
Kremer’s reading is compellingly defended, I find it difficult to prevent it from 
collapsing into some form of intellectualism—as it overtly occurs with an account 
of knowing how like Hickman’s, that shares with Kremer the influence of Hyman. 
My worry in this respect is that the idea of correctness involved in “getting it 
right” seems to strongly suggest that truth conditions are somehow grasped by the 
agent, and thus that all knowledge is some way or another based on 
representational states.28 
                                                        
22 Fantl labels the view as ‘strong anti-intellectualism’ (“Knowing How and Knowing That,” 452) 
and by Hetherington as ‘practicalism’ (“Knowledge and Knowing,” 73), but both are careful 
enough not to attribute it to Ryle. 
23 “Knowing How and Knowing That,” 4. 
24 Ibid, 9.  
25 The Concept of Mind, 41. 
26 “A Capacity to Get Things Right,” 28.  
27 “How Knowledge Works,” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 433-451. 
28 That is the effect of expressions like “the content of knowledge-how” (Hickman, “Knowing in 
the ‘Executive Way’,” 17), which I find shocking, even if conceived as non-conceptual. Instead of 
with idea of “getting it right,” the unitarianist view may perhaps be better defended in terms of 
achievements or failures, not assuming that the aim is in any sense a correct representation. That 
is: we would need an account of performance assessments that does not rely on how the agent 
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Finally, a pluralist reading of Ryle would hold that knowing-how and 
knowing-that are not reducible to each other (as both intellectualists and 
practicalists hold, in different directions), nor to a third more basic genus (as 
unitarists hold), but simply different concepts with strong and interesting 
connections but no common core. David Wiggins, for instance, holds that “Ryle is 
in a position not merely to allow but also to assert that, in their full distinctness, 
knowing how to and knowing that need one another.”29 According to such a 
reading, theoretical knowledge relies on the practical, and practical knowledge 
rests on the propositional. The problem with this interpretation is that it would 
still have to show what response Ryle would give to the challenge of accounting 
for the unity of knowledge. The disparity and irreducibility of those two concepts 
could be understood as a denial that there is one think called knowledge besides 
that terminological coincidence—a position that may in the end favour the 
standard tacit assumption that epistemologists ought only to be concerned with 
‘genuine’ knowledge, i.e. of the propositional kind, an unfortunate idea that may 
be found in virtually all introductions to the field.30 
By my side, I am reluctant to accept any of these three possibilities because 
they seem to be involved in a misleading quest for Ryle’s original theoretical views, 
Ryleanism, as a positive epistemological theory of the nature of knowing-how, 
whereas I would say that this common assumption is what may be challenged. My 
point in this respect is that, in general, Ryle was not trying to offer any clear-cut 
explanatory hypotheses of concepts. We may not find in his work, in particular, 
any reductive analysis of epistemic concepts, in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and his approach to knowing-how is no exception.31 A possible 
explanation of this is that his philosophical method was not really driven towards 
                                                                                                                      
represents the desired outcome, but on the way or manner in which she is able to conduct 
performances (successfully, with mastery, skilfully…). For hints in this direction, and doubts 
about the very idea of non-conceptual content, see Daniel D. Hutto, “Unprincipled Engagements. 
Emotional Experience, Expression and Response,” in Radical Enactivism (Amsterdam: J. 
Benjamins Pub. Co., 2006): 13-38. 
29 David Wiggins, “Knowing How to and Knowing That,” in Wittgenstein and Analytic 
Philosophy: Essays for P. M. S. Hacker, edited by Hans-Johann Glock and John Hyman (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009): 264–5. 
30 If the concepts of knowing-how and knowing-that were finally so irreducible to each other, 
nor to any common term, that would strongly suggest that the former is in the end of no 
genuinely epistemic concern, being more related to the philosophical study of powers. See Vega, 
“Reglas, Medios, Habilidades,” 7. 
31 Hornsby, “Ryle’s Knowing How,” 81-2. 
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theory. Stanley himself recognises this anti-theoretical tendency,32 but still, as I 
will show, he recurrently reads Ryle as an author that does puts forward and 
defend positive views. In contrast, different interpreters hold today—and I would 
forcefully agree with them—that Ryle’s philosophical project was quite a different 
one, with important resemblances to Wittgensteinian therapy.33 Such an 
intellectual project might not seem as trendy today as it once was, at least for those 
who expect that their philosophical work will have some clear impact on the 
mainstream development of cognitive sciences—and I cannot think of many more 
evident examples than Stanley’s case.34 Nevertheless, even if one does not 
sympathise with the kind of anti-theoretical slant that Ryle manifests, approaching 
his work with the fundamental aim of reconstructing and objectively evaluating 
his positive theoretical views may not be the most charitable way to read him.  
I do not want to deny that Ryle has a positive view on the topic under 
discussion, nor do I want to hold that his 'logical geography' is fully deprived of 
positive theses. Still, even if there were such theses, and even if it were evident 
today that such theses are wrong, that does not invalidate his achievements with 
respect to his primary negative and therapeutic goal. And, as Ryle himself avows: 
My argument has been intended to have the predominantly negative point of 
exhibiting both why it is wrong, and why it is tempting, to postulate mysterious 
actions and reactions to correspond with certain familiar biographical episodic 
words.35 
If we take Ryle's reflections at face value, any reading of his works that were 
primarily focussed on constructing his alleged own positive position could run the 
risk of missing his “predominantly negative point”—and, in this respect, it does not 
matter much if the interpreter is in favour of Ryle or against him.  
 
                                                        
32 “Ryle was a committed ordinary language philosopher, unreflectively and immediately hostile 
to analysis and reduction of any kind.” Stanley, “Knowing (How),” 10. 
33 See Julia Tanney, “Rethinking Ryle: A Critical Discussion of The Concept of Mind,” in Gilbert 
Ryle: The Concept of Mind, 60th Anniversary Edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009): xi. Stephen 
Hetherington discusses the resemblance between Ryle’s reflections on know-how and 
Wittgenstein’s ones on rule following in “Knowledge and Knowing,” 31. See also: David 
Löwenstein, “Knowledge-How, Linguistic Intellectualism, and Ryle’s Return,” in Conceptions of 
knowledge, edited by Stefan Tolksdorf (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012): 301; Hasselberger, 
“Propositional Attitudes.” 
34 For a critical view on this trend see Max R. Bennett and Peter M. S. Hacker, Philosophical 
Foundations of Neuroscience (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003). 
35The Concept of Mind, 135. 
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5. Verificationism and Behaviourism 
Accusations of verificationism (2) and behaviourism (3) go hand in hand. The 
former is a position in the philosophy of language according to which a sentence 
may only be meaningful in so far as it is verifiable, at least in principle, and the 
latter is a statement in the philosophy of mind, that would force us to account for 
all psychological states and processes in terms of behavioural patterns. Those are 
supposed to be objectively verifiable, in contrast to psychological states and 
processes themselves, which (unless they are one’s own) allegedly depend on 
rational reconstruction and speculative hypothesis about the unseen. For that 
reason, behaviourism shows up as a position in psychology and the philosophy of 
mind that is in accordance with verificationism in semantics and the philosophy of 
science. These views are usually assumed as handicaps of Ryleanism, given that 
they are views that did not survive the arrival of functionalist and cognitivist 
approaches to the mental. Now, Stanley’s reading of Ryle does not just identify his 
position with these views but, furthermore, reads him as systematically producing 
positive defences of them, for instance, when he claims that: 
The Concept of Mind is devoted to advancing Ryle’s behaviourist views. It is not 
immediately evident how the topic of knowing how fits into this now unpopular 
agenda,36 
or that: 
Ryle assumes a theory of meaning that connects linguistic meaning to 
verifiability: a term is meaningful only if it is possible in principle to verify 
whether or not it applies to something.37 
Stanley’s interpretation of Ryle then assumes his texts as pursuing the basic 
goal of advancing positive theses, behaviourism on the one hand and 
verificationism on the other, two positions that would both be motivated by one 
same epistemic fear of the unknowable.  
However, at the same time, Stanley is perfectly aware that both positions are 
explicitly rejected by Ryle, or at least set aside as unclear and problematic—the 
former in his papers “Unverifiability-By-Me”38 and “The Verification Principle,”39 
and the later in different papers complied in On Thinking.40 That is the reason why 
I call these “accusations,” and not simply “restatements” of Ryle’s views. The fact 
                                                        
36 Stanley, “Knowing (How),” 1. 
37Idem, 7. 
38 In Gilbert Ryle, Collected Papers, vol. 2 (London: Hutchinson, 1971): 126-236. 
39Idem, 300-306. 
40 Gilbert Ryle, On Thinking, edited by Konstantin Kolenda (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979). 
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that Ryle explicitly rejects those views, or at least holds that they require much 
qualification, is certainly not determinant, since he could be a verificationist and a 
behaviourist malgré lui. And it is understandable indeed that both views could 
seem appealing to somebody pursuing Ryle’s project in so far as, if those two theses 
were correct, we would have excellent reasons to definitely reject HIDDEN. 
Verificationism and behaviourism bring to the foreground everything that is 
allegedly beyond the performance itself, and always—but at too high a price. Ryle 
is not forced to endorse such radical views in order to hit his target with respect to 
HIDDEN. If those principles were correct, they would prove that all intelligence is 
out there, and that all the mental is at sight for external observers—but Ryle’s 
target requires much less than that. It would be enough for his purposes to show 
that some acts of intelligence may be there, at sight, and that some mental 
attributions are not hypotheses on what happens in the agent’s secret grotto, but 
something that we may actually see in what she is doing. In other words: Ryle does 
not need the sledge-hammers of verificationism or behaviourism in order to crack 
the nut of HIDDEN.  
Much more could be said about this, but it will suffice to have shown, first, 
that Ryle puts both behaviourism and verificationism under critical assessment, not 
being committed to any of them; and, second, that those views seem to be much 
stronger than the ones he would require to achieve his goal of undermining 
HIDDEN. It is not clear why Stanley insists so much on Ryle’s arguments having 
these today unfashionable burdens. 
6. Fictionalism 
This point brings us to accusation (4), according to which Ryle can only have a 
fictionalist account of mental processes.41 Fictionalism is a view according to which 
our talk about mental states and processes is nothing but a façon de parler, which 
does not aim at literal truth. Our attributions of beliefs, desires or intentions would 
not token any real events occurring in the world, and would thus be mere fictions. 
Once again, such interpretation is an accusation in clear contradiction with what 
Ryle claims about his own position. It is hard to deny that he does explicitly affirm 
the existence of mental processes occurring in the privacy of the agent’s mind, 
something that we, external observers, cannot see from the outside: as Stanley 
recognises, silent soliloquies, mental imagery and acts of remembering are present 
all over his texts as real occurring events.42 Ryle never denies the existence of 
                                                        
41 Stanley, “Knowing (How),” 9. 
42 In this respect, see Brian Weatherson, “Doing Philosophy With Words,” Philosophical Studies 
135, 3 (2007): 429-437; Eric Schwitzgebel, “Gilbert Ryle’s Secret Grotto,” in The Splintered Mind 
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private mental processes of that kind. What he denies is their essentially private 
nature, the idea that those processes are something that, in principle, could never 
happen on the outside, at sight of others. Those processes, he claims, may happen 
in the agent’s privacy, but they could have occurred in the public scene just the 
same. And, most importantly, when they do happen in the public scene, they do 
not denote intelligence because there is something simultaneously occurring 
behind the scene, something that makes them be truthful hallmarks of intelligence: 
the occurrence of intelligent behaviour at sight is not a secondary manifestation of 
what is primarily happening in the privacy of the agent’s mind.  
The accusation of fictionalism is related in Stanley's interpretation of Ryle to 
the attribution of another opinion that seems untenable:  
On Ryle’s picture of action, intentional actions are not the effects of inner 
categorical causes. Thus, his picture of knowing how coheres with his conception 
of intentional action. Ryle’s metaphysical picture is widely regarded as 
implausible, since it involves ungrounded dispositions—that is, the possession of 
dispositions without any categorical basis.43 
Stanley is probably identifying Ryle with a variety of the anti-causalist 
account of rational action, i.e. the idea that reasons are not causes, championed by 
authors like Wittgenstein and Anscombe—a view that Small has recently linked to 
Ryle’s work44—, but this view ought not be confused with the blunt idea that 
intentional actions have simply no causes. It may be perfectly defended that 
rational explanations are not causal explanations without being committed to the 
much more contentious view that intentional actions have no causal explanation. 
Anti-causalists may accept that there is some causal explanation for every 
intentional action, but still hold that elucidating such cause is not what rational 
explanations aim at because such actions are somehow intrinsically normative.45 
As Small has shown, Ryle holds that intelligence attributions are 
dispositional but, at the very same time, he is very careful not to identify them 
with the sort of dispositions that may be reduced mechanical or merely causal 
explanations, either internal or external, since he does not purport at all to explain 
                                                                                                                      
(blog), June 15, 2007, http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2007/06/gilbert-ryles-secret-
grotto.html. 
43 Stanley, Know How, 17. 
44 Small, “Ryle on the Explanatory Role,” 5. 
45 “Our inquiry is not into causes (and a fortiori not into occult causes), but into capacities, skills, 
habits, liabilities and bents” (Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 33). For a defence of the intrinsic 
normativity of these concepts see Löwenstein, Know How as Competence, 13. 
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knowing-how in terms of pure habits or automatic manifestations.46 Ryle’s 
dispositionalism would be an attempt to escape such reduction of prudence and 
intelligence to causal explanations that are blind and mechanical in kind. In order 
to defend this, he needs to show that at least some of our mentalist vocabulary 
(knowing how attributions, epithets of intelligence or prudence and, in general, all 
the rich vocabulary that we employ to describe human performances) is not based 
on causal hypotheses, but that its meaning stems from the way we use this jargon 
at the personal level. Such vocabulary opens up a logical space where certain kinds 
of rational assessment and criticism becomes appropriate,47 expectations of success 
are backed by some expectations of warrant48 or control,49 and new concerns 
relating responsibility and resilience arise.50 The impossibility to reduce such 
explanations to mechanical causes is not a deficit in the explanation itself, but the 
defining feature of the kind of “imponderable evidence” that constitutes our 
knowledge of human beings—what since Wittgenstein is known as 
Menshenkenntnis.51 
7. A Reconstruction of Ryle's Argument 
In contrast to the former ones, the remaining two theses, (5) and (6), are presented 
by Stanley as objective restatements of Ryle’s positions. That is, according to 
Stanley, those are views Ryle would be glad to endorse:  
PREACHIVISM: acting on some piece of knowledge-that requires an act of 
contemplating the proposition in question: an occurring mental process of 
‘preaching’ by which the proposition is considered as a reason for action. 
DISTINCTIVISM: what guides us in action is a distinct cognitive capacity from 
what guides us in reflection. 
In my view, Ryle does not endorse any of these views, which means that 
Stanley would not just have levelled some unfair accusations—(1) to (4)—, but 
furthermore he would have misidentified Ryle’s own position. In order to show 
the reason of the misunderstanding I will have to reconstruct Ryle's argumentative 
strategy with some detail. 
                                                        
46 Small, “Ryle on the Explanatory Role,” 74. 
47 Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson, “Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and 
Intellectualism,” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 5, 5 (2017): 41-55. 
48 Katherine Hawley, “Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice,” in Knowing How: Essays on 
Knowledge, Mind, and Action, edited by Bengson and Moffett, 28.  
49 Löwenstein, Know How as Competence, 107. 
50 Benjamin Elzinga, “Self-Regulation and Knowledge How,” 121.  
51 Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) §§358-360. 
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To be fair, behind the appearances, Ryle’s argument is anything but simple. 
In order to show that INTELLECTUALISM is wrong he puts himself in the shoes 
of a putative defendant of it, and presents her with a dilemma that has two 
untoward consequences. The argument is thus a dilemma within a reduction, and 
the crucial idea that we should keep in mind while recreating such an argument is 
that, just like any reductio, it is not based on premises that the author himself 
would be happy to endorse in any of its branches, but precisely on those that he 
wants to dismiss—or at least some of them. Failure to notice this is what makes 
Stanley’s reading of Ryle so misguided. He seems to believe that Ryle himself 
endorses, assumes or at least presupposes the premises of the argument he puts 
forward.52 
Let's begin by considering the way Ryle introduces the argument in his 
Presidential Address:  
The prevailing doctrine (deriving perhaps from Plato’s account of the tripartite 
soul) holds: (1) that Intelligence is a special faculty, the exercises of which are 
those specific internal acts which are called acts of thinking, namely, the 
operations of considering propositions; (2) that practical activities merit their 
titles ‘intelligent’, ‘clever’, and the rest only because they are accompanied by 
some such internal acts of considering propositions (and particularly ‘regulative’ 
propositions). That is to say, doing things is never itself an exercise of intelligence, 
but is, at best, a process introduced and somehow steered by some ulterior act of 
theorising. (It is also assumed that theorising is not a sort of doing, as if ‘internal 
doing’ contained some contradiction).53 
I have quoted Ryle in length because the problem with this introduction is 
in the final brackets—and in the very fact that it is said in brackets. If we took 
what is said in them at face value, Ryle would be claiming that the position he 
targets is simply inconsistent—at least if we identified ‘thinking’ with 
‘theorising’—in the sense that the prevailing doctrine would be an attempt to 
preserve two claims that contradict each other. There would not be much point in 
writing a paper against a position that is introduced as overtly inconsistent. 
However, the rest of Ryle’s paper is not futile because HIDDEN, as I said at the 
                                                        
52 A similarly unfair criticism may be found in Stalnaker, when he says: “I think the more general 
intellectualist view that (Ryle) was criticizing is a picture that Stanley should also want to reject. 
(That is, I think Ryle was right to criticize the intellectualist view of knowing-how. His mistake 
was to accept, or at least presuppose, an intellectualist account of knowing-that).” (Robert 
Stalnaker, “Intellectualism and the Objects of Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 85, 3 (2012): 755). By my side, I see no mistake in assuming a wrong view in order to 
reject it by reductio.  
53 “Knowing How and Knowing That,” 1. 
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beginning, is no allegedly consistent theory in and by itself, but just an 
unstructured assumption, some kind of blur desideratum: not a set of well-formed 
positive theses, but an implicit intuition that guides the authors in their search for 
the mental. Its lack of consistency is the reason why anybody attempting to 
respond to it in a positive way will have to confront a dilemma: either she assumes 
that “thinking” is an activity (something that we do), or she denies that it is so, 
understanding it, or at least its purest manifestations, as static contemplation. Let 
me label each of those alternatives as: 
ACTIONALISM: thought is an activity (a sort of doing). 
CONTEMPLATIONALISM: thought is not an activity (“internal doing” is a 
contradiction).  
In order to respond to their own contradictory desiderata, those willing to 
propose a theory in accordance with HIDDEN have to go either for 
ACTIONALISM or for CONTEMPLATIONALISM. The former horn of this 
dilemma leads to the first one of Ryle’s arguments: if, for some action to be 
intelligent, it must be accompanied by some occult act of thought (we thus enter 
the reductio by assuming HIDDEN), and thinking itself is a sort of action (and we 
opt for the first horn of the dilemma: ACTIONALISM), then that further act of 
thought is something that the agent does. But then it must be something she could 
do intelligently or stupidly. We certainly want her to do it intelligently, but then 
HIDDEN forces us to assume that it must be accompanied by some further act, 
which is what makes it intelligent, and an infinite regress is thus initiated.  
The consequences of going for the second horn are not more pleasant: if 
some action’s being intelligent means that it must be accompanied by some hidden 
act of thought (we enter the reductio by assuming HIDDEN too), but thinking is 
not itself an action (we opt for the second horn of the dilemma in this case: 
CONTEMPLATIONALISM), we then have to account for the way thought, as inert 
static contemplation, may ever have effects in action, which is dynamic, but lacks 
itself from intelligence. This second horn forces those bewitched by HIDDEN to 
envisage a sort of impossible mediator, a ‘schizophrenic broker,’ who should have a 
bit of theory and a bit of practice, but be none of them. Nothing, according to Ryle, 
could ever meet such incompatible demands, at least in the framework of 
HIDDEN. In other words: there is no escape for those assuming HIDDEN: there is 
an infinite regress waiting for them at the end of the corridor of ACTIONALISM, 
and a schizophrenic broker at the end of the corridor of 
CONTEMPLATIONALISM. They’d better leave HIDDEN behind.  
Now, the way I see it, the problem with Stanley’s reading is that he fails to 
grasp Ryle’s general strategy, the disjunctive structure of this dilemma, attributing 
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to him each premise of his reductio at different moments of his reconstruction. 
Stanley’s Ryle would have somehow assumed both ACTIONALISM and 
CONTEMPLATIONALISM, in order to defeat a contradictory straw man, which 
would have gone for both horns of his dilemma at the same time. Ryle appears in 
Stanley’s eyes as someone who holds both the view that knowledge-that requires 
the ‘contemplation of propositions,’ a sort of inner ‘preaching,’ and the idea that we 
have to introduce an impossible broker between thought and action. But none of 
those are theses that Ryle himself endorses! They are only considered by him for 
the sake of the argument in different horns of the dilemma he confronts his 
opponent with. If anything, they are his opponent’s theses, those he wants to reject 
in the end, by means of a reductio, and not the premises that Ryle himself would 
endorse as his own positive views. 
The failure to see this is what makes Stanley summarise Ryleanism as a form 
of DISTINCTIVISM, something that he does since the perplexing first lines of his 
first chapter:  
Humans are thinkers and humans are agents. There is a natural temptation to 
view these as distinct capacities, governed by distinct cognitive states. When we 
engage in reflection, we are guided by our knowledge of propositions. By 
contrast, when we engage in intelligent action, we are guided by our knowledge 
of how to perform various actions. If these are distinct cognitive capacities, then 
knowing how to perform an action is not a species of propositional knowledge. 
(…) That there is an important distinction between the kinds of states that guide 
us in action and the kind of states that guide us in reflection is orthodoxy in much 
of the most influential work in twentieth-century philosophy. (…)But the most 
systematic attempt to prove what philosophers and laypersons typically assume, 
that what guides us in action is a distinct cognitive capacity from what guides us 
in reflection, is due to Gilbert Ryle, in his major work, The Concept of Mind.54 
I have to admit that reading these very first lines of Stanley’s book caused 
me to jump in my chair—a jump that was somehow my first step into writing this 
paper. In effect, had Ryle ever claimed this, he would have pictured us all as 
‘schizophrenic brokers,’ divided into the irreconcilable sides of theory and practice, 
thought and action, contemplation and performance. According to Stanley’s Ryle, 
human beings would be essentially fragmented, having two sorts of ‘capacities’ or 
‘cognitive states,’ some of them directed at doing and some others at thinking; 
some being the basis of our know-how, and others grounding our knowledge-that; 
some would have to do with behaviour, and the others with thought. Stanley is 
right indeed in denouncing this as a dead end—but it is not Ryle’s position. At all. 
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In fact, for those of us that attempt to make a more sympathetic reading of Ryle, it 
is hard to conceive a less Rylean picture of the human mind. 
When placed in Ryle’s general strategy, DISTINCTIVISM appears not as 
Ryle’s general view about the relationship between thought and action, but as the 
undesired conclusion behind the second horn of the dilemma: 
CONTEMPLATIONALISM. If Ryle’s imagined opponent assumed that genuine 
thought is not itself a kind of action, but static contemplation, then he would have 
to introduce something between action and thinking, which is precisely what Ryle 
wants to show is not necessary. Considering his general goal, if we had to restate 
Ryle’s positive views, it is much more sensible to construct Ryle as holding that 
there is no such thing as a ‘distinctive cognitive capacity for reflection’ that could 
be told apart from the sort of capacities that guide us in action: his aim is not to 
defend that there is a gap between behaviourally inert contemplation and 
unintelligent mechanical movement, one that would require the introduction of 
some brokering mechanism, but, on the contrary, that there is no such gap to 
overcome.  
To summarise, I find two main troubles with Stanley’s reading or Ryle with 
respect to (5) and (6): first, he considers Ryle’s arguments in a summative way, as 
theses he subsequently endorses, while they should be read as disjunctive 
alternatives, belonging to different horns of one dilemma. And second, and most 
importantly, Stanley takes the premises of those arguments as opinions that Ryle 
himself endorses, or even as the essence of his views on the nature of the human 
mind, whereas they are only theses he assumes for the sake of the argument, 
attributing them to his opponent in order to turn an unarticulated preconception 
(HIDDEN) into a viable theory and, then show that such a theory does not stand 
up to scrutiny. They are thus not positive theses Ryle would be happy to endorse 
himself at all. 
8. Bridging the Divide 
This should suffice to show where does the misunderstanding begin and how far it 
gets. Now, although Stanley fails to identify Ryle’s views in some crucial concerns, 
some genuine disagreement remains. As I said at the beginning, the basis of that 
disagreement is their opposed assessment of INTELLECTUALISM as an 
epistemological thesis, which Stanley affirms while Ryle denies. In the remaining 
part of the paper I would like to discuss Stanley’s positive views on the nature of 
knowledge-how in order to show that, once Ryle’s position is correctly 
understood, they are not so deadly rivals as it may seem. On the contrary, despite 
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their divergence on the specific thesis of INTELLECTUALISM, they both seem to 
share some important attitudes that are utterly against HIDDEN.  
Stanley replies to the first Rylean argument (the infinite regress) by claiming 
that one may act on some piece of knowledge-that with no need to perform any 
additional act of considering a proposition, in the sense of ‘preaching’. He follows 
Ginet on this, who rightly defended the point that one may act on a piece of 
knowledge–that directly, just like one may exercise one's know-how directly, with 
no need to recall regulative propositions.55 Even if Ginet holds this view as a 
criticism of Ryle's opinions, it is hard to imagine Ryle disagreeing on this. If the 
interpretation I have been proposing is correct, Ryle never makes the positive 
claim that ‘preaching’ is a necessary requirement for propositional knowledge-that 
to have practical effects. This is what, in his opinion, advocates of HIDDEN would 
be forced to assume if they went for the first horn of the dilemma, which he 
himself never does.56 
Now, in order to reply to Ryle’s second argument, Stanley holds that the 
function assigned to the schizophrenic broker could be fulfilled by some kind of 
automatic process, or by a sort of by-product of mental mechanisms, and does not 
have to be a further action of the agent.57 He thus defends the possibility of sub-
personal mechanisms that are not themselves agential, but implement the 
machinery of agency. They would be contentful, but nobody would be aware of 
their contents.58 This is probably the point where the divergence between Ryle and 
Stanley would be stronger, and harder to overcome, given that Stanley’s 
functionalist and modular image of cognition seems to be radically alien to a 
Rylean conception of the mind—an account of intentionality and rationality that is 
all deployed at the personal level.  
However, in my opinion, a better option for Stanley would be to impeach 
the very need for a schizophrenic broker instead of holding that the broker is 
conceivable, realising that such a need only arises when one assumes that 
theorising is not doing. Why should Stanley buy that premise at all? Why should 
he hold that acts of thinking are not acts, or that ‘internal doing’ implies a sort of 
                                                        
55 Carl Ginet, Knowledge, Perception and Memory (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1975): 7. 
56 See Hetherington, “Knowledge and Knowing,” 29-31. 
57 Stanley, “Knowing (How),” 26 
58 Fridland provides compelling reasons to suspect that subpersonal automatic mechanisms could 
ever fulfil the role required by intellectualists (see “Problems with Intellectualism,” 891). 
Furthermore, such scepticism may be supported by a radical confrontation with the 
representational cognitivist assumptions that underlie Stanley’s approach, in the lines proposed 
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contradiction? Once such assumption is discarded, the need to reply to the 
challenge disappears. In other words: Stanley does not have to take upon himself 
the task of finding out a mediator between static contemplation and mechanical 
action. There is a better way for him to go: to admit a notion of thought that is not 
alien to practice—a mission for which he could find in Ryle a good ally.  
Furthermore, a more sympathetic reading of Ryle’s text would show that 
there are moments where he seems to be preparing the ground for concepts that 
would later be introduced by Stanley and Williamson in order to understand the 
particular way in which rules must be grasped by agents in order to be effective in 
practice. I am referring to practical modes of presentation, which are the ones 
under which agents are supposed to grasp those regulative propositions that are, in 
their view, the content of know-how.59 Many authors have claimed in this respect 
that the notion of practical modes of presentation is a surreptitious way of 
introducing the very idea that Stanley and Williamson’s theory was supposed to 
explain, namely, know-how.60 Remember: an agent knows how to perform a 
certain activity, according to the new intellectualists’ theory, in virtue of her 
knowing a proposition about the way in which she could do it. But grasping that 
proposition in abstract is not enough: she would have to do it “under a practical 
mode of presentation,” which implies certain dispositions to behave according to 
the rule. That is what, in Koethe’s opinion, commits them to circularly: in order to 
know that that specific way is the right one, the agent would have to know how to 
apply the rule. This criticism is contested by Jeremy Fantl, who objects to Stanley 
and Williamson’s reduction for different reasons.61 In Fantl’s opinion, there is no 
such circularity, and the problem is quite the opposite one: modes of presentation 
fall short of being enough to guarantee know-how. The fact that the proposition is 
grasped under a practical mode of presentation is compatible, in his opinion, with 
the agent being unable to apply the regulative proposition in particular occasions, 
and therefore it is not enough for her to really know how to do the thing.  
I do not want, nor need, to take stance in this discussion. It may well be the 
case that practical modes of presentation imply spurious circularity, as Koethe 
claims, or perhaps they do not help solving the infinite regress argument, as Fantl 
holds. What is relevant for my point is that the very idea of practical modes of 
presentation is a feature of Stanley and Williamson’s account that may be 
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considered in accordance with Ryle’s central positive views. In other words: 
practical modes of presentation are a Rylean seed at the core of new 
intellectualism. The very idea is, in spirit, Rylean. This may sound odd, I concede, 
but an unprejudiced reading of Ryle would help defuse that sense of oddity. For 
instance, he holds that “even where efficient practice is the deliberate application 
of considered prescriptions, the intelligence involved in putting the prescriptions 
into practice is not identical with that involved in intellectually grasping the 
prescriptions.”62 Such a statement leaves the door open for other ways of grasping 
those same contents, which are more appropriate for that practical function—such 
as practical modes of presentation.  
The fact that Stanley’s positive conception on know-how is not so far from 
Ryleanism could make Stanley’s views seem contentious from the point of view of 
mainstream cognitivism. That is so because some propositions, according to 
Stanley, would not even be grasped in the relevant way unless properly rooted in 
the behavioural patterns of the agent. The possibility, or even the necessity, of 
being disposed to engage in certain kinds of actions would be constitutive of the 
very understanding of their propositional content. Stanley exemplifies this 
following Gareth Evans, when he holds that the right comprehension of some de se 
thoughts requires the acquisition of some dispositional properties. The same would 
happen, in Stanley’s opinion, with respect to know-how which, in his view, is a 
variety of de se thought. In Stanley’s own words, the kind of intellectualism he 
intends to deploy is based on ‘a view of at least some of the constituents of 
propositions according to which they can only be entertained if one possesses 
certain dispositions.’63 They could thus not consist in pure, simple, theoretical 
representations.  
I am not sure that such a view is consistent, but if it were correct, there 
would be processes of intelligence constituted by what happens, or may happen, 
‘on the outside,’ on the body, on behaviour, at sight, and no narrow definition of 
such ‘intellectual’ processes could be restricted to what happens in the inner space 
of the mind. This may be understood as an attempt, by the part of Stanley, to leave 
HIDDEN behind, at least partially, in that it explicitly rejects its 
CONTEMPLATIONALIST horn, by defending ‘that propositional knowledge is not 
behaviourally inert—indeed even entertaining certain thoughts is not 
behaviourally inert, but entails the possession of dispositions.’64 
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In other words: even if Stanley’s intellectualism claims that knowing how to 
do something is just a case of knowing that something is the case, it does not follow 
that know-how may become a purely ‘intellectual’ process, in the sense that Ryle 
found problematic: the body may have not merely a causal, but a constitutive role 
to play, and action itself would be part of the definition of those epistemic states, 
and not just their external, causal manifestations. Understanding those propositions 
from a practical perspective, which is, in Stanley’s view, constitutive of know-how, 
would be something necessarily linked to actual performances and personal 
practice—all events that may happen in the public scene. 
I believe that Stanley is so close to Ryle in this respect that one may even 
wonder whether their allegedly insurmountable dispute is based on any deep 
disagreement.65 The introduction of those dispositional features in the very core of 
some propositional attitudes removes the grasping of those propositions from the 
realm of passive contemplation. Stanley and Ryle seem to be there on the same 
page, sharing the aim to take knowledge-that out of the contemplationalist limbo, 
which is a good part of Ryle’s job against HIDDEN. From that perspective, 
Stanley’s “reasonable intellectualist” owes much to Ryle’s views—more that he is 
willing to confess. It may even be considered as a variation of Ryleanism more than 
as a reaction against it. 
Let me finish with one general reflection that may help framing what is at 
stake in this confrontation: disconcertingly, outside the debate on knowledge-
how—but still inside the field of epistemology—Stanley has defended a position 
that he himself dubs as ‘anti-intellectualist.’66 In that case, he is against the view 
that knowledge (in general, but he is focusing there on knowledge-that) is a purely 
epistemological notion. On the contrary, against this ‘purist’ position he defends, a 
variety of what would later be called ‘pragmatic encroachment,’ as the view that 
pragmatic factors belong to the core of our epistemic deliberations. He has been 
rebuked for labelling his own positions in such a misleading way, viz. as 
‘intellectualist’ on the debate on knowledge-how, and as ‘anti-intellectualist’ in the 
debate on knowledge-that, a decision that apparently endangers the consistency of 
his general account.67 Of course, it would be easy to dismiss this apparent 
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inconsistency as merely terminological—as Stanley himself does68—, but I believe 
there is a more remarkable moral to be earned from it: Stanley has set himself the 
general aim of bridging the divide between knowledge and practice, offering an 
account of the former that is constitutively linked to the latter. And he does so in 
those two different moments by confronting those views about knowledge-that 
which are, in his opinion, too intellectual (as in Knowledge and Practical 
Interests), and those views about knowledge-how which he finds too anti-
intellectual (as in Know How). I believe this general project is perfectly consistent, 
just like it is reasonable to build a bridge by starting it from both sides of the river, 
which does not mean that one is working against oneself. The message I have 
intended to convey with this paper is that, just as Stanley himself may be found at 
different moments on different sides of the intellectualist divide, while still being 
coherent in his general aim, he could have been more alive to the fact that Gilbert 
Ryle’s attack on intellectualism was an attempt to attain quite a similar goal. In that 
case, he would perhaps have found out that his attacks on Ryle's anti-
intellectualism were an unfortunate case of friendly fire.69 
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